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PHYSICLNS and surgeons are required by the ethics of their profession
to preserve the secrets of their patients which have been communicated to
them or learned from the inspection of symptoms and other bodily con-
ditions. How far this ethical requirement should be enforced by law is
a question on which there is much difference of opinion among both law-
yers and doctors.1
No state has made disclosure of confidence a crime, but in some the
license to practice may be revoked for this cause. Seventeen states still
seem to preserve the view of the English common law that there is no
legal check upon the revelation of medical secrets. On the witness stand,
at all events, a doctor in these states must tell all he knows.2 The re-
maining states adopt a half-way attitude towards the obligation of secrecy,
of which the New York statute is typical.' Unless the patient consents,
the doctor is not allowed, while testifying in court, "to disclose any infor-
mation which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity
and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity." Thus
there is no liability to the patient if the doctor tells every last detail in
clubroom gossip or in the thickly veiled items of a medical journal, but he
is prohibited from divulging any of the truth in the place where it is
usually most stringently required-the witness stand. Some of these
statutes make exceptions for special medical situations where disclosure
is badly needed, like abortion.4 And several of the states recognizing the
t Langdell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. For a classic discussion of this problem, see 8 W10Torfa, E\'srrENcE (3d ed. 19401
§§2380-91. See also (1921) 152 L. T. 53 (debates at British Medical Association);
(1922) 153 L. T. 228, 252 (debates at British Medicu-Legal Suciety) ; (1937) 83 L J.
320 (debates in House of Commons).
2. These states are Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Gwurgia, Illinuis,
'Maine, 'Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhde Island, Suuth
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia.
3. This statute was first enacted in 1828. See N. Y. CiviL PnA.cricE Acv (1920)
§§ 352, 354, as subsequently amended.
4. 8 WNIGORE. EVmENCE, §2380, n. 5, gives full references to the state statute&
The ensuing list mentions only the date of the original enactment without regard to sub-
sequent amendments. The statutes vary in their terms, particularly as to waiver oi the
privilege. The ensuing list mentions only variations of especial medical interest, includ-
ing the fact of adoption of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (U. N. D. A.): Ala,-a
(1913) (except for insanity); Arizona (1913) (U. N. D. A.); Arkan-sas (1919); Cali-
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doctor-patient privilege in general have adopted the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act, which provides that "information communicated to a physi-
cian in an effort unlawfully to procure a narcotic drug, or unlawfully
to procure the administration of any such drug, shall not be deemed a
privileged communication." 5
Although the general policy of the law is to obtain as many facts as
possible about a controversy on trial, rules of evidence often exclude
reliable testimony if it was acquired by the witness through some con-
fidential relation. A husband would hesitate to tell his wife about
damaging facts and the thorough intimacy of marriage would be turned
into watchful suspicion and reticence, if the law did not refuse to make
her the means of his undoing.6 Likewise a man might not consult an
honest lawyer, or if he did, would tend to keep back from him anything
that looked unfavorable to the case, if the lawyer could be made the
leading witness against him and forced to reveal all that was told him
by his client. So the lawyer cannot speak without his client's consent.,
In many states a statute protects the secrets of the confessional; 1 and
even without such legislation few lawyers would have the hardihood to
ask that a priest who keeps silent should be imprisoned for contempt of
court.
Some doctors may feel that it is an unfair discrimination against
their profession if lawyers' secrets are protected from disclosure in court
fornia (1872) (except for mental condition and venereal disease) ; Canal Zone (1934) ;
Colorado (1921) ; District of Columbia (1919) (U. N. D. A.) ; Georgia (1935) ; Hawaii
(1925) (U. N. D. A.) ; Idaho (1919) ; Indiana (1926) ; Iowa (1897) (U. N. D. A.) ; Kan-
sas (1923) ; Kentucky (1915) ; Louisiana (1928) ; Maryland (1935) (U, N. D. A.); Mich-
igan (1915) (except for illegal marriage of persons sexually diseased) ; Minnesota (1913)
(except for bastardy) ; Mississippi (1906) : Missouri (1919) (except for abortion) ; Mon-
tana (1935) (U. N. D. A.); Nebraska (1922) (U. N. D. A.); Nevada (1912) (U. N.
D. A.); New Mexico (1929) (U. N. D. A.); New York (1828) (except for narcotic
investigations) ; North Carolina (1919) (allows presiding judge of superior court to
compel disclosure when necessary to administration of justice, U. N. D. A.) ; North
Dakota (1913); Ohio (1921) (U. N. D. A.): Oklahoma (1931) (U. N. D. A.); Ore-
gon (1920) (U. N. D. A.); Pennsylvania (1895); Philippine Islands (1901); Puerto
Rico (1911) (except for malpractice, U. N. D. A.) ; South Carolina (1934) (U. N. D.
A.) ; South Dakota (1919) (U. N. D. A.) ; Utah (1917) (U. N. D. A.) ; Virgin Islands
(1920); Washington (1909); West Virginia (1897) (U. N. D. A.); Wisconsin (1919)
(except for lunacy and malpractice, U. N. D. A.) ; Wyoming (1920) (U. N. D. A.).
5. Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, § 17, 12. This statute has been adopted in the fol-
lowing states and territories, of which those starred in the list do not recognize a general
doctor-patient privilege: Arizona, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland,*
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Puerto Rico, South Carolina,* South Dakota, Tennessee,* Texas,* Vermont, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
6. See 8 WIGAIORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2332-41.
7. Id, §§2290-2329. Full arguments for and against this privilege are given in
§ 2291.
8. Id. §§ 2394-96.
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and yet physicians' secrets must be laid bare. Perhaps lawyers as well
as doctors should be forced to divulge information when the judge thinks
disclosure essential to the public interest, and proposals are now under
consideration for extensive modifications of the attorney-and-client privi-
lege.' However, the success or failure of these proposals ought not to
affect the question whether medical secrets should be inviolable in court.
The relation between lawyer and client does differ materially from the
relation between doctor and patient, and each privilege should be judged
on its own merits. The administration of justice ought not to be shaped
by inter-professional jealousies and trivial claims to prestige. Instead, we
can all agree that it is a misfortune when a lawsuit is won by the party
who would lose it if all the facts were known, and that we increase the
risk of such a miscarriage of justice whenever we allow an important
witness to keep any helpful facts away from the judge and jury. Secrecy
in court is prima facie calamitous, and it is permissible only when we
are very sure that frankness will do more harm than good. With doctors'
secrets as with any other kind of secrets, the only proper test is the wel-
fare of the community. Courtroom secrecy in the particular case must
produce a public good which more than offsets the risks resulting from
the concealment of truth and from the lies which can be made with less
fear of detection. If the doctor-patient privilege should prove to be
socially undesirable, doctors, possessing a high professional sense of pub-
lic welfare, should be among the first to oppose it.
The reasons usually advanced for extending the privilege of silence
to the medical profession are not wholly satisfactory. First, it is said
that if the patient knows that his confidences may be divulged in future
litigation he will hesitate in many cases to get needed medical aid. But
although the man who consults a lawyer usually has litigation in mind,
men very rarely go to a doctor with any such thought. And even if they
did, medical treatment is so valuable that few would lose it to prevent
facts from coming to light in court. Indeed, it may be doubted whether,
except for a small range of disgraceful or peculiarly private matters, pa-
tients worry much about having a doctor keep their private affairs con-
cealed from the world. This whole argument that the privilege is neces-
sary to induce persons to see a doctor sounds like a philosopher's specula-
tion on how men may logically be expected to behave rather than the
result of observation of the way men actually behave. Not a single New
England state allows the doctor to keep silent on the witness stand. Is
there evidence that any ill or injured person in New England has ever
stayed from a doctor's office on that account?
The same a priori quality vitiates a second argument concerning the
evils of compelling medical testimony, namely, that a strong sense of
9. See 'Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testinony by Rules
of Evidence (1943) 10 U. or Cm. L. REv. 285.
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professional honor will prompt perversion or concealment of the truth.
Has any member of the numerous medical societies in New England
observed such a tendency among New England doctors to commit per-
jury for the sake of "professional honor"? In reality, there is far more
danger of perjury if the physician cannot testify, only it will be perjury
by the patient. In many states where the privilege exists, an unscrupulous
plaintiff in an accident case can exaggerate the injury without fear of con-
tradiction by the doctor whom he consulted right after the accident. The
patient can tell the sad story of his injuries to judge, jury, and spectators,
and then he can object that it would violate his bodily privacy if the doc-
tor were allowed to take the stand and testify that the accident had left
no traces one hour after it occurred. Fortunately, there is some limit to
this absurdity, for most courts hold that if the patient goes into the details
of his injuries, he has waived his privilege and has thrown open the whole
question of his bodily conditions.' Otherwise he could make the statute
both a sword and a shield. But even this rule about waiver does not pro-
mote truth-telling any too well. The patient may tell some rather big
lies about his health without "going into details," and the courts are by no
means clear in defining the point where details begin. There is also abun-
dant confusion on the question whether what the patient says under cross-
examination opens the door for his doctor to testify. Some courts hold
that cross-examination is not a waiver like direct testimony, because the
patient does not now speak willingly. By this view, the opposing lawyer
who ventures to ask the patient any questions may find the witness going
into the most intimate details without regard to either privacy or truth,
and yet the lawyer will be helpless to contradict this highly colored story
by calling the physician."
Another argument for the privilege is that employees are often treated
after accidents by physicians who are in charge of the company hospital
or otherwise dependent upon the good will of the employing corporation.
It was urged to legislatures that some of these physicians were taking ad-
10. The cases are collected in Note (1938) 114 A. L. R. 798. See also 8 WirMoRE,
EVIDENCE, § 2389.
11. The absurdity of this solicitude for the patient's privacy is illustrated by Harp-
man v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N. E. (2d) 776 (1937), 11 U. oF CIN. L. REV.
544. The plaintiff sued the owner of a building for heavy damages, charging that the
defendant negligently suspended a fire hose from the building in such a manner that a
violent wind caused the hose to break a window, knocking glass against the plaintiff, He
testified that since this accident he had suffered loss of weight, severe and chronic head-
aches, failing eyesight, insomnia, facial paralysis, and inability to walk normally; but
that before the glass hit him his general condition was "very good." On cross-examina-
tion he admitted that he had consulted various physicians before the accident. The de-
fendant called one of these'doctors for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff was
suffering from anemia before the accident, but the court refused to allow the doctor's
evidence "in view of the very delicate and confidential nature of the relation."
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vantage of their position to obtain from the patients information which
would tend to defeat a claim for damages. This argument has the merit
of not being abstract, but of asserting a basis in fact. Yet even if it is
valid, it might be wiser to admit the evidence of the physicians, trusting
in the jury to discount it heavily if an improper attitude towards the
patients exists.
Where the statutory privilege is in force, what is its scope? In the first
place, what sort of medical person is included? 12 Any licensed physician
or surgeon falls within the statute, and this applies to hospital physicians
though they are not specifically selected by the patient.1" There is no privi-
lege for communications to unlicensed practitioners. Thus mental healers,
chiropractors and osteopaths can be forced to disclose communications
from their patients, unless perhaps their professional status is expressly
recognized by law. Nor does the privilege apply to an unlicensed "ortho-
pedist" who is teaching gymnastic exercises taken by medical advice."4
And those psychoanalysts who have been too busy to study medicine must
have spicier facts to relate than physicians, but no court has yet bound
them to secrecy. How about the numerous assistants who surround doc-
tors under modern conditions? MLay attempts have been made to prevent
nurses from telling about their patients, but these have usually failed.'s
Most courts say that if public policy demands the extension of the privi-
lege to nurses and other hospital attendants, then the change in the law%
should be made by the legislature, not by judicial action. Here is an en-
ticing invitation to organizations of nurses to increase their professional
prestige by lobbying for a statutory amendment which will put them on
the same high level of secrecy as doctors, a result which has already been
accomplished in New York and a few other states. Dentists, druggists
and veterinaries 16 may also resent being left out in the cold.
No end of trouble has arisen about the admissibility of medical records.
If a doctor cannot tell the court what he saw, then the hospital records
in which he wrote down what he saw seem logically just as unavailable.
Yet some courts are impressed by the fact that the law requires such rec-
12. The cases are collected in Note (1930) 6S A. L. R. 176; 8 Wxow cr, E%,i'1cz:n.C
§ 2382.
13. The cases are collected in Note (1923) 22 A. L. R. 1217; (1938) 72 U. S. LAw
Rav. 619.
14. See Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 92 N. E. 337 (1910).
15. The cases are collected in Notes (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1421, (1930) 63 A. L R. 176.
On hospital attendants, see (1938) 22 MARQ. L. REv. 211.
16. The status of veterinaries was raised in Hendershot v. Western Union Telegram
Co., 106 Iowa 529, 76 N. IV. 82S (1893), a suit brought by the owner of a race horse
against the Western Union for delay in transmitting a telegram, "Bravo is sick; come at
once." The doctor arrived at last, but Bravo died. The Western Union lawyer asked the
doctor what the owner said to him about Bravo's symptoms. The owner urged that the
communications from him to the veterinary were privileged, but the court held that
veterinaries were not covered by the statute.
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ords to be kept, and see little sense in this if they cannot be used for the
sake of attaining justice.' For example, it would be absurd if the rec-
ords of a state hospital for the insane could not be consulted in a will con-
test for their bearing on the mental capacity of the testator. 8 So judges
have been inclined to read a wide exception into the statute to cover such
situations. Thus death certificates ought to be admissible." In New York
this exception has also been extended to public health records, which were
admitted to show that the defendant was a typhoid carrier who had been
warned not to participate in the service of food. The records were used
to establish her liability in damages to the estate of a man who died of
typhoid after eating food which had passed through her hands.20
Autopsies add further confusion. It is generally held that if the doctor
did not attend the person during his lifetime, then the doctor can testify
about performing an autopsy because the relation of the physician and
patient did not exist.2 ' "A deceased body is not a patient.122 For exam-
ple, a man who carried heavy accident insurance became suddenly ill, and
the physician who was called removed him to a hospital and there con-
tinued to treat him until his death. The hospital pathologist was then
summoned to perform an autopsy, which showed that the man died from
the effect of wood alcohol in home-made gin. Although the first doctor
was merely allowed to give his opinion that wood alcohol in gin was capa-
ble of causing the death, the second doctor was permitted to give all the
details discovered during the autopsy.2 3 Yet another court, regarding this
device of evading the statutory privilege by switching doctors as an arrant
subterfuge, concluded that a physician performing an autopsy "steps into
the shoes of the attending physician, and must be treated as if he were
the assistant of the attending physician, holding the autopsy at the direc-
tion of the latter, and that the information acquired by him through the
autopsy is privileged." 24
The requirement that the physician's knowledge about the patient be
received in a professional relation raises great difficulties. Not everything
medical that a doctor sees or hears is privileged. For example, if called
to a house to see one person, the doctor can sometimes tell what he inciden-
17. The cases are collected in Notes (1931) 75 A. L. R. 378, (1939) 120 A. L. R.
1124.
18. See Liske v. Liske, 135 N. Y. Supp. 176 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1912).
19. Yet some courts exclude them. See the authorities in 8 WmiMOtE, EvIDFcCE,
§2385a; Notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 359, (1926) 42 A. L. R. 1454, (1935) 96 A. L. R. 324,
20. Thomas v. Morris, 286 N. Y. 266, 36 N. E. (2d) 141 (1941), 136 A. L. R. 856,
21. The cases are collected in Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 1134; 35 LAW NoMs 87
(N. Y. 1931).
22. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Bergeron, 25 F. (2d) 680 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
23. Ibid.




tally observed as to the health of other members of the fanily. - ' Though
it would seem that symptoms which were obvious to every one without
medical inspection cannot be said to be disclosed in confidence, several
cases have forbidden hospital doctors to testify that when a man was
brought in they smelled liquor on his breath or observed other common
symptoms of intoxication." If the patient voluntarily employs the physi-
cian, the privilege is clear. But suppose the doctor renders first aid to an
unconscious man. No confidence is reposed. but the doctor does attend
him in a "professional capacity." In a New York case a physician was
called by a hotel to attend a guest without the latter's knowledge. The
man said he had taken poison, but cursed the doctor and refused to have
anything to do with him, although the doctor administered a hypodermic.
The hotel guest was held to be a patient, although he did not want to be,
and the doctor was forbidden to tell about the poison in order to show
that the patient had forfeited his life insurance by committing suicide. -
Even though a professional r elation exists, only information necessary
to enable the doctor to act in that capacity is privileged. 'Matters which
are entirely distinct from medical facts may be disclosed, 5 such as the
patient's remarks about his will. An Indiana doctor was called to attend
a sick wife and also cast a professional eye on her husband. While leaving
the house, he heard the husband say, "I will get her yet, damn her; I will
get her yet." Shortly afterwards the wife shot her husband. When tried
for murder, she called the doctor as a witness to support her story that
she killed her husband in self-defense while he was approaching her with
an open knife in his hand. The trial court excluded the doctor's evidence
on the ground that he was in the house in the capacity of a physician; the
jury disbelieved the wife's story, and she was convicted of manslaughter.
The upper court reversed, however, holding that the doctor should have
been allowed to testify about threats of death though not about health.""
Often the illness and another fact are closely connected, as in a New
York divorce trial where a physician was asked to disclose a communica-
tion from the misguided wife as to the paternity of an expected child. The
referee excluded this communication, because it must have been given
as a sequel to the wife's disclosure of her pregnancy, which was clearly
privileged and could not be repeated. On the other band, a California
doctor was allowed to testify that while he was delivering an illegitimate
child a certain man was present and admitted that he was the father.-"
25. See Jennings v. Supreme Council, 81 App. Div. 76, 81 N. Y. Supp. 90 (1st
Dep't 1903); Nichols v. State, 109 Neb. 335, 191 N. W. 333 (1922).
26. The cases are collected in Note (1932) 79 A. L. R. 1131.
27. Mleyer v. Knights of Pythias, 178 N. Y. 63, 70 N. E. 111 (1904).
28. The cases are collected in 8 WIGMorE, EvIDNacE, 2383; Note !,1923) 24 A. L R.
1202; (1938) 13 WAsH. L. REv. 141.
29. 'Myers v. State. 192 Ind. 542, 137 N. E. 547 (1922).
30. In re Baird's Estate, 173 Cal. 617, 160 Pac. 1078 (1916).
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A similar question arises when the victim of an accident describing his
symptoms to a physician throws in occasional statements about the way
he was hurt. But it seems clear that the speed of the trolley car which hit
him has no more bearing on the application of surgical dressings than the
legitimacy of an expected child has on the medicines or other pre-natal
care which should be given to the mother.3 1
Logically it may be that the facts leading up to a physical condition are
often not necessary to enable the physician to act in a professional capac-
ity and consequently are not protected by the statute. Yet practically it
is very unjust to a patient if his conversations with the physician can be
sifted out by the law into two classes of utterances of which only one class
is kept secret. What sort of confidence is secured by the statute if a sick
and perhaps hysterical patient must be constantly on the alert, every time
a question is asked him, to determine at his peril whether it is necessary
for treatment, and, even if it is, must be watchful lest he add something
to his answer which is not necessary? If the privilege is to exist at all,
the law might well take the position that all the communications of the
patient which are actuated by his feeling of confidence in his medical
adviser and which he would naturally make in furnishing the doctor with
information as a basis of treatment are entitled to secrecy, even though
some of these facts if wrenched from the conversation and taken singly
have no medical value. A patient should not be forced to tell his story
to the doctor with the circumspection of a lawyer drawing pleadings.
The privilege belongs to the patient and not to the physician. Hence
the patient cannot be forced to testify about the consultation any more
than can the doctor. Conversely, if the patient consents to the disclosure,
the doctor can no longer insist on remaining silent. The effectiveness of
anything less than express consent, however, raises a perplexing issue."
Suppose, for example, the plaintiff in a personal injury case, who has been
to several doctors, calls only one physician who is favorable to his own
claim. There is great confusion as to whether the plaintiff can still insist
that it might cause him "embarrassment and disgrace" if the defense were
allowed to put on his other doctors who are ready to tell a very different
story about the plaintiff's bodily condition.33
If the patient is dead and can no longer waive his privilege, must the
doctor's lips then be sealed forever? Some statutes have neglected to pro-
vide for this emergency, while others expressly permit the executor or
administrator of the patient to authorize the doctor to speak. 4 Yet no
31. If the doctor were a psychiatrist, who was curing her of melancholia or some
other mental or nervous disorder, questions on such a fact would be highly important.
32. The effect of the patient's testifying about his own health has already been dis-
cussed. See p. 610 supra.
33. See Comment (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 529; Notes (1929) 62 A. L. R. 680, (1934)
90 A. L. R. 646; (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 931.
34. The cases are collected in Notes (1924) 31 A. L. R. 167, (1940) 126 A. L. R.
380; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2391.
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matter how carefully the statute is drawn, it may fAil to specify some
person connected with the decedent who has an excellent reason for desir-
ing the doctor's testimony. For example, in a Wisconsin case a widow
suing as a beneficiary under an accident insurance policy was unable to
prove that her husband's death was accidental except by the testimony of
the physician who attended him. The Wisconsin statute did not say that
a beneficiary could waive the privilege; the court forced the doctor to keep
silent, and the widow recovered nothing on the policy." Here the privi-
lege, which is supposed to exist for the patient's benefit, operated to defeat
one of his dearest desires. Wigniore's view that nobody except the patient
may take advantage of the privilege would have accomplished a just re-
sult in this case. Certainly a person directly antagonistic to the patient
should not profit from the privilege! 0
The possibility that the patient's death silences the doctor is particularly
objectionable when the patient was murdered. It may be very important
to have a physician disclose the physical condition of the victim during
the interval between the crime and the death. Sometimes a man kills a
woman to get her out of the way because she is expecting a child, and
medical testimony is necessary to establish his motive. Judges usually
obviate this difficulty by saying that criminal cases are not within the spirit
of the statute, although some courts refuse to carve out such an excep-
tion.Y Usually the desired testimony relates to the bodily condition of the
victim, but it may conceivably concern that of the accused and here the
bars have been higher."" Suppose a murder on a dark street. A policeman
testifies that he could not recognize the killer, but that he shot at him as
he was running away and hit him in the left arm. The prosecution calls
a physician for the purpose of having him testify that one hour after the
murder the accused called at his office and was treated for a bullet-wound
in his left arm. The accused objects on the ground that he does not want
to disclose his ailments to the public. It is by no means certain on the
authorities that the doctor would be allowed to testify, and so the prisoner
might be acquitted for inability to identify him as the murderer."
35. Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N. W. 749 (1920) (t;o
judges dissenting); Note (1921) 15 A. L. R. 1544.
36. Many insurance policies endeavor to avoid such difficulties by a clause in which
the insured waives the privilege in advance. Such a clause is usually held valid, but it
has no effect in New York. The cases are collected in Note (1928) 54 A- L R. 412; 1
WIGMORE, EVIEN cE, § 7a.
37. The cases are collected in Note (1926) 45 A. L. M. 1357; 8 WNTIsnom, Evirmrcq,
§2385.
38. See People v. Murphy, 101 N. Y. 126, 4 N. E. 326 (1985).
39. A similar but much more perplexing conflict of loyalties was presented to Dr.
C. E. May of Minnesota. While Dillinger, the former Public Enemy No. 1, was fleeing
from prison, he went to Dr. May to be treated for gunshot wounds incurred during his
escape. Was Dr. May ethically bound as a physician to preserve secrecy or was he under
a duty as a citizen to notify the police? In fact he neglected to inform the police of his
ministrations and was consequently imprisoned two years for harboring a fugitive wanted
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The Code of Evidence recently published by the American Law Insti-
tute 40 was originally drawn without any privilege for medical secrets in
court.4 ' At the last minute lawyers from states which have the privilege
in their statutes forced the draftsmen of the Code to insert three new
sections (§§ 221-223) establishing the physician-patient privilege. For-
tunately, numerous limitations are specified which will prevent a repetition
of many of the miscarriages of justice already described above. It may
be argued in defense of the Code that these limitations greatly improve
the law in states where the privilege now exists. Nevertheless, the Ameri-
can Law Institute might better have adopted a complete reform. In the
first place, no matter how numerous and careful the limitations, some new
situation is bound to arise where secrecy ought not to be maintained; yet
the Code will prevent disclosure because the draftsmen in 1942 could not
foresee this situation and so failed to insert any limitation to take care of it.
Secondly, although the Code will help make the law better in states which
now have the privilege, it will help make the law worse in states which
have hitherto let in the truth. The powerful influence of the American
Law Institute is likely ultimately to cause the general adoption of the Code
in all the states, including those which now reject the doctor-patient privi-
lege. Thus truth will be curtailed in regions where it is now available
without any apparent corresponding gain of medical care. In Massachu-
setts, for instance, the doctor is now protected by the trial judge against
needless disclosures, but told to speak out when truth is important. If
Massachusetts should enact the Code of Evidence, many hours and many
dollars would be spent on the intricacies of this new privilege 42 and
sooner or later some badly needed testimony would be lost. But what
would health gain? Does anybody seriously believe that the Massachu-
setts General Hospital or the Boston Lying-In Hospital would suddenly
rise to new heights of excellence because patients could throng to them
assured that if they should ever get into litigation a few of their medical
secrets would occasionally be hidden from the prying curiosity of judges
and jurors?
While the law has been so solicitous about the doctor's duty to keep
silent on the witness-stand, it has done little to protect the patient's medi-
cal secrets from disclosure to the world in general. No statute requires
under a federal warrant. The Lancet commented that "colleagues in every country will
applaud his action in not betraying a professional trust." (1934) 226 LANcur 1183. Not
many laymen are likely to join in the applause.
40. See Morgan, loc. cit. supra note 9.
41. See RESTATEMENT, EVIDENCE (Proposed Final Draft, March 16, 1942, submitted
to the Annual Meeting, May, 1942).
42. The New York doctor-patient statute (CIVIL PRACTICE AcT §352) is twelve
lines long, and it takes eight pages of small type just to summarize briefly the judicial




the doctor to pay damages to his patient. At common law, untruthful
statements by the doctor may constitute actionable defamation,"3 but if
he tells the truth in breach of confidence it is very doubtful whether he
incurs any contractual liability. Recovery was denied the patient in the
only case in point, Simnonscn v. Swcnsen. 44 A guest of a small hotel in
a Nebraska town consulted a doctor who diagnosed his ailment as syph-
ilis. He told the patient of the danger of communication and got his prom-
ise to leave the hotel the next day. On that day the doctor made a pro-
fessional call on the owner of the hotel, and on finding that the patient
had not moved out he warned the owner that the man had "a contagious
disease." The patient was forced to leave the hotel, and sued the doctor
for disclosing medical secrets. The Nebraska court thought that a doctor
ought to pay damages for telling the truth in breach of the confidential
relation to his patient, but that he should have the same right as a man
who is sued for slander to insist that he acted under a duty to make the
disclosure, which was more important than the duty to keep silent. Clearly
his statutory obligation to make health reports would justify breaches of
confidence therein. Here, however, he was under no legal obligation to
divulge his patient's disease; but the court decided that in view cof the
great danger to life resulting from silence he had a moral obligation to
speak which overrode his duty of secrecy. Consequently, the patient lost
his case.
Much can be said for and against this result. One commentator says
that the Nebraska case "stands for the triumph of medical altruism over
legal duty." " Certainly, disclosure of risks of infection is very desir-
able; but it would be wiser to require all contagious diseases to be reported
to a public official, who should have power to take all steps necessary to
protect people from the patient, whether this required publicity or his
removal to a hospital. There are obvious dangers in leaving it to every
physician to determine whether circumstances justify him in betraying
intimate confidences to the lay public.
Legislatures and courts have been occupied for over a century in clos-
ing the physician's mouth in the very place where the truth is badly needed.
And yet the much more important obligation of his silence in private life
has hardly been considered. In the few instances where honest patients
do dread disclosure of their physical condition by a doctor, their fear is
not that the truth may some day be forced from him in court, but that
he may voluntarily spread the facts among his friends and theirs in con-
versation. Yet against this really dangerous possibility the statutes and
courts give almost no protection.
43. See Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 Pac. 572 (1917).
44. 104 Neb. 224, 177 N. W. 831 (1920), 9 A. L. R. 1254, (1921) 30 Y.L L. J.
289, (1920) 20 CoL L. REv. 890, (1921) 34 Htav. L. RE%, 312, (1920) 75 J. Am,. Mz.
Ass'.x 1207.
45. (1921) 34 HlAv. L. REv. 312, 314.
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